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Abstract
Indirect network eects exist when the utility of consumers is in-
creasing in the variety of complementary products available for use
with an electronic hardware device. In this paper, we examine how
trade liberalization aects production structure in the presence of in-
direct network eects. For these purposes we construct a simple two-
country model of trade with incompatible country-specic hardware
technologies. It is shown that, given that both countries' hardware
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devices remain in the trading equilibrium, both countries gain from
trade liberalization. It is also shown that if only one country's hard-
ware remains in the integrated market, the other country may lose
from trade liberalization.
2
1 Introduction
The proliferation of trade liberalization through both economic integration
(e.g., the European Union) and preferential trade agreements (e.g., NAFTA)
has spawned a vast literature on the implications of trade liberalization.
As yet, however, little attention has been paid to the implications of trade
liberalization in the presence of products with indirect (or virtual) network
eects.
Indirect network eects exist when the utility of consumers is increasing
in the variety of complementary products available for an elctronic hardware
device.1 Examples of such devices include personal computers, video casette
recorders, and consumer electronics products. In systems that pair hard-
ware with software, an indirect network eect arises because increases in the
number of users of hardware increase the demand for compatible software
and hence the supply of software varieties. benet to all consumers The con-
sumers who purchase hardware/software systems thus constitute a virtual
(or indirect) network.
Despite the fact that many industries characterized by indirect network
1A direct network eect can arise when increases in the number of consumers on the
same network raise the consumption benets for everyone on the network. The most
common examples involve communications networks such as telephone and fax systems.
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eects are crucially related to trade liberalization, the literature on (indirect)
network eects is almost exclusively focused on closed economies.2 Since the
role of indirect network eects is amplied in the globalized world,3 it seems
important to explore the impact of liberalization in the trade of products
with indirect network eects.
As our primary contribution, we examine how trade liberalization aects
production structure in the presence of indirect network eects. For these
purposes we construct a simple two-country model of trade with incompatible
country-specic hardware technologies which is an extension of Church and
Gandal's (1992) closed-economy model. It is shown that, given that both
countries' hardware devices remain in the integrated market, both countries
gain from trade liberalization. It is also shown that, if only one country's
2The seminal contributions on the role of a \hardware/software" system are Chou and
Shy (1990, 1996), Church and Gandal (1992, 1996) and Desruelle et al. (1996). See Econo-
mides (1996), Shy (2001) and Gandal (2002) for surveys of the relevant closed-economy
literature. For the open-economy context, Gandal and Shy (2001) analyze governments'
incentives to recognize foreign standards when there are network eects. The impact of
trade liberalization, however, is downplayed in their analyses. See, also, Kikuchi (2007).
3Gandal and Shy (2001, p. 364) note that, in 1992, it was estimated that seventy-two
percent of all personal computers throughout the world were IBM-compatibles. That is,
they ran the MS-DOS operating system and were compatible with applications software
written for the MS-DOS operating system.
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hardware remains in the integrated market, the other country may lose from
trade liberalization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
basic model and derives autarky equilibrium. Section 3 describes the trading
equilibrium. Section 4 considers gains and losses from trade liberalization.
Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Suppose that there are two countries in the world, Home and Foreign. In
each country there are three types of goods: hardware, a large variety of
software products, and the outside good. for hardware and We assume that
there are country-specic hardware technologies: Home hardware and For-
eign hardware. We also assume that the hardware technologies are incom-
patible: software written for one country's hardware will not work with the
other country's. The characterization (i.e., location) of the two country-
specic hardware technologies is exogenous: each is located at the end point
of the unit line: let Home technology be at the left end point and Foreign
technology at the right end point. We denote the marginal cost of hard-
ware production in each country by c, which implies there are no sources for
comparative advantage. We further assume that the hardware technologies
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are non-proprietary and that they will be oered at marginal cost. In this
section, we consider the Home autarky situation where only Home hardware
is available.
Consumer preferences over the combination of hardware and software are
modelled as a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) CES utility function.4 We assume that
the distribution of the tastes of Home consumers is decreasing along a line of
unit length t 2 [0; 1]. We also assume that the density of type t consumers
in Home is 1   t: the total number of Home consumers is 1=2. Consumer
densities are mirror images of each other: in Foreign, the density of type t
consumers is t.
The preferences of a consumer of type t for a system are:
U(t) = [
nX
i=1
(xi)
]
(1=)
+   kt; 1=2 <  < 1; (1)
where n is the number of software products written for the Home hardware,
xi is the level of consumption of software product i,   1=(1   ) > 2 is
the elasticity of substitution between every pair of software products, and
we assume that  > k. This specication of preferences incorporates the
assumption that variety is important.
The representative consumer who purchases the hardware will maximize
4See, also, Chou and Shy (1990) and Church and Gandal (1992).
6
(1) subject to the following budget constraint:
nX
i
pixi = e  c; (2)
where pi is the price of Home software variety i, e is the total expenditure
allocated to hardware and software, and c is the price (i.e., cost) of a unit of
Home hardware.
The solution to this problem consists of the following demand functions:
xi = (e  c)P
 1=pi ; (3)
where
P = [
nX
j=1
(pj)
1 ]
1=(1 )
: (4)
The indirect utility of a type-t consumer who purchases a Home system
is
V (t) = n1=( 1)(e  c)=p+   kt: (5)
The indirect utility function is concave in n: the marginal benet of another
software variety is decreasing.
Now, turn to the cost structure of software production. The technology
for the production of software is characterized by increasing returns to scale,
since software creation typically involves xed costs. We denote the constant
marginal cost of software production for every product by b, and the software
development cost by f .
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We assume that software rms are monopolistic competitors, and thus,
each product is priced at a markup over marginal cost b:
p = b=(   1): (6)
rational expectations. provide software for. providers choose to provide
for the Home hardware. software product developed for that systems. Then
the prot of a Home software rm is5
 = (p  b)(x=2)  f; (7)
where x = (e c)=np. In the autarky situation in which only Home hardware
exists, all Home software rms choose to provide software that is compatible
with Home hardware and the number of Home software rms is determined
via free entry as follows:
nA = (e  c)=2f; (8)
where A refers to the autarky value.
The indirect utility of a consumer located at t is
V A(t) = (nA)
1=( 1)
(e  c)(   1)=b +   kt:
Consumer welfare in the autarky situation is
WA =
Z 1
0
[(nA)
1=( 1)
(e  c)(   1)=b +   kt](1  t)dt
= (1=2)[(nA)
1=( 1)
(e  c)(   1)=b + ]  k=6: (9)
5Note that the total size of the Home consumer is 1=2.
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3 Trading Equilibrium
The commencement of trade implies two basic changes in the market: (a)
both Home and Foreign hardware devices are available to all consumers, and
(b) the distribution of consumers' tastes is uniform along the line and the
total number of consumers becomes 1.
The timing of the game is as follows:6 In the rst stage software rms
enter the industry. There is free entry into the software industry and software
rms have rational expectations. Although there may be more than one
equilibrium software conguration, we show that the free-entry number of
software rms, N = n + n, is unique, where n and n are the number of
rms providing software for Home and Foreign hardware, respectively. In the
second stage, software rms simultaneously choose which platform to provide
software for. In the nal stage, each consumer purchases either a Home or
a Foreign hardware system and some of the compatible software. We solve
this problem backward.
3.1 Final Stage
Since we assume the marginal costs (prices) of hardware and software are
equal for both systems, consumers determine which hardware to purchase
6This is taken from Church and Gandal's (1992) closed-economy model.
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considering only their tastes and the amount of software available for each
system. From (5), a consumer located at t purchases Home hardware if the
following inequality holds:
n1=( 1)(e  c)=p+   kt > (N   n)1=( 1)(e  c)=p+   k(1  t); (10)
where use has been made of the equation n+n = N . Therefore, the location
of the marginal consumer who purchase Home hardware is given by a function
of n, that is,
t(n) = [n1=( 1)   (N   n)1=( 1)](e  c)(   1)=2kb + 1=2: (11)
And the rst derivative of t(n) is positive:
t0(n) 
dt(n)
dn
=
[n(2 )=( 1) + (N   n)(2 )=( 1)](e  c)
2kb
> 0: (12)
This means that the share of Home hardware is increasing in the amount of
software for it. It can also be shown that
t(0)  0 and t(N)  1 () N1=( 1)  kb=[(e  c)(   1)] (13)
and
t0(N=2)  1=N () N1=( 1)  21=( 1)kb=2(e  c): (14)
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Based on the above, we can draw the function t(n) as shown in Figure 1,7
where curves A, B, and C correspond to the graph of t(n) under each of
the following three cases: in case A, N1=( 1)  kb=[(e  c)(   1)]; in case
B, kb=[(e   c)(   1)] < N1=( 1) < 21=( 1)kb=2(e   c); and in case C,
N1=( 1)  21=( 1)kb=2(e  c).8
Figure 1
Note that in cases B and C, t(n) can reach 0 or 1, even if there are still
two types of software. Since the market is of unit length, that is, 0  t  1,
there exists a critical number of software rms for each type of hardware such
that if the number of software rms for one technology exeeds the critical
number, then all consumers purchase the dominant hardware. On the other
hand, in case A, there are two types of consumers unless one hardware is
standardized; no software for the other hardware exists.9
7The second derivative of t(n) is negative (positive) if n is smaller (greater) than N=2,
since
d2t(n)
dn2
=  
[n(3 2)=( 1)   (N   n)
(3 2)=( 1)
](   2)(e  c)
2kb(   1)
;
where  > 2 from the assumption  > 1=2.
8The importance of discrimination between case B and C will appear in the following.
9Since we assume that hardware only facilitates the consumption of software and pro-
vides no stand-alone benets, in case A, the marginal consumer, t, changes discontinuously
to 0 or 1 when n is equal to 0 or N .
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3.2 Second Stage
In the second stage, software rms simultaneously select the network for
which to supply software are. Given the marginal consumer, t, and the
number of competing software rms (n or n), the prot of a software rm
writing software for Home hardware is
(t; n) = t(p  b)x  f = t(e  c)=n   f; (15)
and that for Foreign hardware is
(t; n) = (1  t)(p  b)x   f = (1  t)(e  c)=n   f; (16)
where x = (e  c)=np. From these equations, it is easily derived that
(t; n)
>
<
(t; n) () t
>
<
n
N
: (17)
Based on the latter inequality, each rm considers whether t(n) is greater
than n=N or not, and then chooses the network to supply.
3.2.1 First Stage
At any equiliblium where two networks coexist, (t; n) = (t; n) must be
satised. Therefore, t = n=N holds at the equilibrium and
 =  = (e  c)=N   f: (18)
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On the other hand, if all software rms provide software for one network at
equilibrium, then (t; n) = (1; N) or (t; n) = (0; N) hold and
 = (e  c)=N   f or  = (e  c)=N   f: (19)
Thus, the prot of each rm is independent of equilibrium software con-
gurations, and the free-entry number of rms, N , is uniquely given by
N = (e  c)=f from the zero-prot condition.
Based on the foregoing argument, we can conclude that  =  = 0 holds
for any pair (t; n) on the dotted line in Figure 1,  = 0 at (1; N), and  = 0
at (0; 0), while  () is positive (negative) at any pair above the line and
vice versa.
3.3 Nash Equilibrium Congurations
Based on the foregoing argument, we obtain the Nash equilibrium congu-
rations as follows: In order for a conguration to be a Nash equilibrium, it
must be impossible for a software rm to switch networks and increase its
prot.
In case A, the graph of t(n) is drawn as curve A in Figure 1. So, there
are three equilibrium candidates; (n = n = N=2), (n = N; n = 0), and
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(n = 0; n = N). Since
t(n)
8>><
>>:
> n=N if n < N=2;
< n=N if n > N=2;
(20)
we can conclude that only symmetric equilibrium (n = n = N=2) is stable
in the sense of a Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, in case C, the graph is drawn as curve C and
t(n)
8>><
>>:
< n=N if n < N=2;
> n=N if n > N=2:
(21)
Therefore, only two equilibria, (n = N; n = 0) and (n = 0; n = N), are
stable.10
Finally, in case B, the graph of t(n) is drawn as curve B and it is apparent
from the discussion above that all three of the equilibria, (n = n = N=2),
(n = N; n = 0), and (n = 0; n = N), are stable. So, we have the following
lemma:
Lemma: Depending on the parameter values, the following three cases
emerge:
Case A: If N1=( 1)  kb=[(e  c)(   1)], a unique symmetric equilibrium
exists, (n = n = N=2).
10In the interval of n where t(n) is greater than 1 (smaller than 0), the actual marginal
consumer, t, is equal to 1 (0) and is still above (below) the line t = n=N .
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Case B: If kb=[(e   c)(   1)] < N1=( 1) < 21=( 1)kb=2(e   c), three
equilibria, (n = n = N=2), (n = N; n = 0), and (n = 0; n = N), exist.
Case C: If N1=( 1)  21=( 1)kb=2(e c), only two equilibria, (n = N; n =
0) and (n = 0; n = N), exist.
4 Gains/Losses from Trade
We now consider the welfare aspects of trade liberalization. If both countries'
hardware devices (and hence software written for each type of hardware)
remain in the equilibrium (i.e., cases A and B), the indirect utility of Home
consumers who purchase Home hardware (i.e., 0  t  (1=2)) also remains
unchanged.11 Furthermore, consumers who switch from Home hardware to
Foreign hardware ((1=2) < t  1) obtain decreased disutility, since a type-t
consumer who switches obtains tk   (1   t)k and the total gains from this
switch are
R 1
(1=2)[kt   k(1   t)](1   t)dt = k=24.
12 The same thing occurs in
Foreign: consumers who switch from Foreign hardware to Home hardware
obtain decreased disutilities.
11Note that the amount of software for the Home hardware device remains unchanged:
n = nA = N=2.
12Since n = n = nA, the availability of software remains unchanged by switching
hardware devices.
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Proposition 1: If both countries' hardware devices remain in the equilib-
rium, both countries gain from trade.
Note that these gains correpond to those obtained from the \ideal-variety"
approach to trade gains (e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985). By opening
trade, consumers in each country can obtain goods (i.e., hardware) which are
close to their \ideal" type, which constitutes mutual trade gains.
Now turn to the case of standardization (i.e., the acceptance of a single
type of hardware). In cases B and C, there is some possibility that Home
hardware (and complementary software) will vanish in equilibrium.13 In such
a case, the Home welfare level becomes
W T =
Z 1
0
[(N)1=( 1)(e  c)(   1)=b +   k(1  t)](1  t)dt
= (1=2)[(N)1=( 1)(e  c)(   1)=b + ]  k=3: (22)
While there are gains from increased diversity of software provision, there
are losses from switching to the Foreign network. Comparing (9) and (22),
we can obtain the critical condition for losses from trade:
(k=6) > (1=2)[(1=2)1=( 1)   1]N1=( 1)(e  c)(   1)=b: (23)
13If Home hardware dominates the market, Home consumers clear gain from trade lib-
eralization due to increased (doubled) software diversication.
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Note that the LHS indicates increased disutility (i.e., costs) from hardware
switching, while the RHS indicates increased utility (i.e., gains) from software
diversication.
Proposition 2: If one country's hardware dominates the integrated market
and condition (23) holds, the other country loses from trade liberalization.
These results are summarized in Figure 2.14 The possibility of loss from
trade is shown as a shaded area. This implies that trade liberalization leads
consumers to \switch" to a Foreign-dominated brand, thereby increasing
the aggregate disutility. It is important to note that the losses from trade
liberalization occur only if there are multiple equilibria.15 Note also that this
does not mean that all Home consumers lose from trade. Home consumers
who are located near 1 unambigously gain from trade.
Figure 2
14Inequality (23) yields N1=( 1) <   [1=3(1  21=(1 ))]kb=[(e  c)(   1)]. We can
show that if  > ln 3= ln(3=2) then  is greater than kb=[(e  c)(  1)], while it is always
smaller than 21=( 1)kb=2(e  c).
15This nding is consistent with Farrell and Saloner's (1986) results on excess standard-
ization in their closed-economy model.
17
5 Conclusions
Indirect network eects exist when the utility of consumers is increasing in
the variety of complementary products available for a hardware device. In
this paper, we examine how trade liberalization aects production structure
in the presence of indirect network eects. For these purposes we construct a
simple two-country model of trade with incompatible country-specic hard-
ware technologies. It is shown that, given that both countries' hardware
devices remain in the trading equilibrium, both countries gain from trade
liberalization (Proposition 1). It is also shown that, if only one country's
hardware remains in the integrated market, the other country may lose from
trade liberalization (Proposition 2).
The present analysis must be regarded as tentative. Hopefully it pro-
vides a useful paradigm for considering how indirect network eects (or hard-
ware/software systems) aect both the structure of international trade and
the gains or losses from trade liberalization.
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